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DICTA

It is proposed to take a hypothetical client with a hypothetical estate and
to discuss, first, the plan of an estate for such client together with the form of
will, trust, or other instrument that might be used to carry out the plan; and
second, the administration of the estate after the client's death.
The fact situation to be discussed will be an approximation of the typical
estate and typical family relationship of any average business or professional
man. Principal consideration will be given to the problem of best providing
for the future needs of the family should the client die before accumulating
any additional assets.
The morning session will be devoted to a panel discussion of the problems involved in planning the estate so as to obtain the maximum benefit to
the widow and children. The panel will be comprised of Edward King, dean
of the University of Colorado Law School, Wilson Hurt, professor at the
University of Denver Law School and a third member who will be an attorney
engaged in general law practice. Morrison Shafroth will be the moderator.
Judge C. Edgar Kettering of the County Court of Denver will be the
principal speaker at the noon luncheon. He will point out some of the major
pitfalls to be avoided in probate proceedings.
The afternoon session will consist of a series of brief talks on the problems
of administering this same client's estate by lawyers with wide experience and
experts in this field. These discussions will be limited to the practical side of
estate administration-how to do what, when, and why.
Following the afternoon session will be the informal dinner for members,
wives, husbands, ladies and escorts, at which we shall have an opportunity to
meet and hear our American Bar Association president. Judge Orie L. Phillips
will be toastmaster.
Be sure to save the entire day of June 7 and plan to attend this meeting.
Watch for further announcements in DICTA, and make reservations early.

Plan for Reorganization of the Judicial System

of Minnesota t
By M.

J.

DOHERTY*

From a study of the trend of judicial reform in this country and England
over the last century, it will be found that practically every comprehensive
plan for bettering the administration of justice has centered around one or
more of four major principles: (1) unification or integration of the courts;
(2) administrative organization and control; (3) enlargement of the ruletAn address before the State Bar Association of Minnesota. This address is reprinted, with permission, Secause of its timeliness in connection with the work of the
Colorado Bar Association Judiciary Committee in its study of the Colorado judicial
organization.
*Of the St. Paul, Minnesota, bar; chairman of the subcommittee on Unification
of the Courts of the State Bar Association of Minnesota.
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making power of the courts; (4) improvement in selection and tenure of
judges.
Our federal system has shown the greatest progress in this country and
in the past two decades has moved far ahead of the states. However, the
English reforms have been much more radical and complete than anything
seen in this country. Prior to 1873 the English judicial system consisted of
some fifteen different and distinct courts, exclusive of the courts of petty
;urisdiction,-complicated, cumbersome, and confusing. Then came the English Judicature Acts of 1873 and 1875, by which the whole motley assortment of English courts was in effect abolished and was replaced with one
single court called the Supreme Court of Judicature of England. This court
was divided into two branches, the Court of Appeals and the High Court
of Justice. The latter, in turn, had five divisions. The fundamental change
was the erasure of all jurisdictional lines between courts and the substitution for a multiplicity of courts of one court with appropriate subdivisions
or branches. The same acts effected various procedural reforms, established
administrative controls, and conferred plenary rule-making power upon the
courts. There seems never to have been any question but that these acts
accomplished a sound and lasting reform. They have stood the test of experience, and no suggestion apparently has ever come from the English bench
or bar for their repeal or radical modification.
In this country the pioneer advocate of reform along the lines of the
English acts was Roscoe Pound. Probably his earliest public utterance on
the subject was his address at the meeting of the American Bar Associtaion
here in St. Paul in 1906. Three years later a special committee of the American Bar Association at its meeting in 1909 made a notable report, in which
it submitted certain fundamental principles of judicial reform, of which the
first was that:,
"The whole judicial power of every state should be vested in one
great court, of which all tribunals should be branches, departments or
divisions."
There was also recommendation of a thorough organization of the courts on
their administrative side and of more complete rule-making power. This
committee had quite a distinguished personnel, including such men as Edward
T. Sanford, later justice of the United States Supreme Court, Roscoe Pound,
Professor Beale, Judge Amidon, Charles B. Elliott, and about a dozen others.
The report has generally been recognized as an important contribution to
its subject. For many years now proposals along the lines mentioned have
been persistently advocated by such organizations as the American Judicature
Society, the National Municipal League, and the bar associations and judicial
councils of many states. The latest important declaration on the subject is
a report, just submitted, of a special committee of the American Bar Association headed by Judge John B. Sanborn as chairman. This was a sub-
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committee for Minnesota of a general committee on improving the administration of justice. This report naturally carries special weight with us
because of the well-known clearness of vision and soundness of judgment of
Judge Sanborn. Among the recommendations of this report were (1) that
provision be made for a unified judicial system for Minnesota and (2) that
the supreme court be vested with full rule-making power for all of the courts
of the state.
This subject has been under consideration of the Judicial Council of
Minnesota for some time, and in August, 1941, at the instance of the council,
a committee was appointed by Justice Stone, its chairman, to make a survey
and recommend measures for the improvement of our judicial system. He
appointed a number of subcommittees, the one for which I am particularly
speaking being the committee on unification of the courts. The general
committee consists of twenty-two members and includes lawyers and judges
from every section of the state, constituting in the aggregate a very representative cross-section of the bench and bar of Minnesota. The general
chairman is Justice Loring of the Supreme Court, who has been the principal
moving and guiding spirit in the whole undertaking. The committee applied
itself to its job with commendable interest and diligence. Its meetings have
been well attended and the discussions have clearly evidenced serious study
and thought on the part of its members. As the result of its labors the committee has brought forth a plan which I shall try to explain at least in outline.
The first conclusion of the committee was that no adequate reorganization of our court system could be accomplished except by constitutional
amendment. Consequently the plan takes the form of a new judiciary article
to be substituted for present Article VI of the state constitution.
The foundation of the whole plan is to be found in the first section,
which reads:
"There is hereby created The General Court of Minnesota, which
shall have all of the jurisdiction at any time vested in the courts of this
state. It shall have divisions to be known as the supreme court, district
court, and county court."
The effect of this provision, if adopted, will be to place the whole judicial
power of the state in one court with three divisions. These divisions will be
separated by no jurisdictional lines, their separate functions being defined
merely by way of allocating the judicial business of the general court. Each
judge would be in a sense a judge of the whole court and would be eligible
to serve in any division, but of course could sit outside of his own division
only by special assignment. Any case within the jurisdiction of any division
would automatically be within the jurisdiction of the general court and therefore of every division. This would mean that no litigant who had found his
way into any division of the court would afterwards find himself out on his
ear on jurisdictional grounds until he had exhausted all of the remedies
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afforded by the whole judicial system or had had an opportunity of so doing.
The Supreme Court would undergo but little change except that it is
given full rule-making power for all divisions of the general court. Its rules
would have the force and effect of law and would supersede any conflicting
statutes. The court could sit in divisions of not less than three members.
It probably has that power now. It is not contemplated, of course, that it
would divide in cases of difficulty or importance, but for seven supreme court
judges to sit in deliberation upon a question of whether a plaintiff in a $501
personal injury suit is guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law
would seem a pretty obvious waste of judicial man-power. This is the sort
of thing that prompted the provision.
The district court would have substantially its present jurisdiction except
that in counties embracing a city of the first class it would also have probate
jurisdiction. It might under a provision, later to be mentioned, be given
power to review certain orders and decisions.
One of the new and important features of the plan is the creation of
a county court. This court would, in general, take over all of the present
jurisdiction of municipal courts and justices of the peace and, in all counties
not having a city of the first class, also probate jurisdiction. It would have
the number of judges provided by law, except that at the outset all municipal
and probate judges would automatically become judges of the county court.
Municipal courts and justices of the peace are eliminated, and the probate court is assimilated, as explained, by the district and county courts. One
result of this will be to end the senseless practice of appeal from the probate
to the district cburt.
A problem that gave the committee a great deal of trouble was that of
petty civil and criminal litigation. The 4uestion was whether the newly
created county court would be a suitable tribunal for disposal of the large
volume of small civil matters, and the even more troublesome volume of
petty criminal matters now disposed of by justices of the peace and municipal
courts. The problem was especially serious in relation to rural communities.
The solution proposed is the creation of a special officer of the county court,
to be known as magistrate, clothed with minor civil and criminal jurisdiction.
The maintenance of such an officer, however, is left optional with each
municipality, and no provision for such officer was thought necessary in
respect to cities of the first class.
Provision is made that the clerks of all the courts shall be appointed by
the courts, the popular election of clerks being entirely dispensed with.
We come next to one of the most important innovations of the plan.
A common criticism of our judicial system has long been alleged waste and
inefficiency, due to lack of any administrative supervision or control. To
remedy this defect there is created a body to be known as the administrative
council, which is given very important powers. This council is to consist
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of three representatives of each division of the general court, that is, three
judges of the supreme court, three of the district court, and three of the
county court. The representatives of each division are to be elected by the
members of that division. The council is given general supervision of the
administrative organization and operation of the general court and its divisions and authority to prescribe the duties of the administrative and clerical
personnel of all divisions. It is given authority to appoint an administrative
head of the general court to be known as administrative director. It is given
power to create subdivisions or departments of the district and county courts
and to allocate matters to these departments. This provision has in mind the
possibility of separate departments for such special branches of court work
as probate matters, domestic relations, criminal cases, offenders, conciliation,
and the like. Such departmentalization of court work has often been advocated as a means of furthering specialization on the part of judges.
The council is given power to modify the jurisdiction properly exercisable by the district and county courts and to provide for review by a panel
of district court judges in certain cases decided by the county and district
courts, and in such cases to condition the right of appeal to the supreme
court upon leave of that court. The committee felt that the time might come,
if it is not yet here, when good purpose would be served by conferring this
limited power of review upon judges of the district court. The expectation
would be that a reviewing panel of three or more members would be set up
and be given cognizance of certain defined cases of lesser importance. In
order that its decisions might count for something, they should, at least if
unanimous, be made final unless the supreme court should order further
review in that court.
The purpose generally of the council's power over the district and county
courts is to introduce a measure of elasticity into those courts. It was
realized that the county court particularly, being something entirely new,
may need adjustment from time to time to make it fit properly into the field
for which it is intended. The judges of the courts are manifestly in the best
position to observe the working of the judicial system, and through their
representatives on the council to promptly apply to it the lessons of every
day experience. No similar opportunity for observation is open to legislators and no such promptness of action could be expected of them. Here we
have a completely integrated and thoroughly coordinated judicial system.
It is closely adapted to what we might call judicial self-government. In the
operation of that system and its improvement and adaptation, within the
constitutional framework, to future needs there could be no safer guide than
the composite judgment of those who are charged with its administration.
A few incidental provisions might be mentioned.
All judges are subject to an age limit of seventy years except those in
office when the new article takes effect. There has long been need of some
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provision for involuntary retirement of judges-something better than the
cumbersome and unused method of impeachment. The cases most in need
of remedy are those of judges who become incompetent by reason of mental
or physical disability but who refuse to recognize their incapacity. For such
cases the plan gives the administrative council authority to investigate and
determine the question of competence and to retire judges who refuse voluntarily to retire after incompetence is found by the council to exist.
There is provision for retirement compensation applicable to judges reaching the age limit and to those retired for disability. Any such judge who has
served ten years or more in judicial office in this State is given retirement
compensation of one-half his salary, with power left in the legislature to
increase the amount if it should see fit.
What I have said has not been intended as an argument for the plan.
There will be time for full discussion after the bar has had an opportunity
to examine and consider the committee's final report. All I have tried to do
is to give you a very brief sketch of the background of the committee and an
outline of the salient features of its proposal and a few of the considerations
upon which its adoption is recommended.

Our Returning Lawyer-Veterans
L. GOBIN, major, Judge Advocate General's Dept., army, served
from Aug. 1942 to Nov. 1946. Basic training and service with Coast Artillery
(Anti-Aircraft Command), vicinity Washington, D. C. He was commissioned
in the Judge Advocate General's Office, Washington; attended Judge Advocate
General's School, Ann Arbor; went overseas Jan. 1944; and served as asst.
judge advocate of L. Island Command, New Caledonia, and as staff judge
advocate of Guadalcanal Island Command, and of the Army Air Forces, New
Caledonia. He was admitted to the Colorado bar in 1932, and practised in
Rocky Ford until his entrance into the army. He has an A.B. from Denver
Univ., and LL.B. from Harvard.
WILLIAM

Law Books For Sale
Harold F. Mudge, 1180 Magnolia St., Denver, has for sale a set of 1935
Colorado Statutes Annotated, including the new volume 1 containing the
Rules of Civil Procedure, which-he will sell for $65, and a Colorado Digest
by the West Publishing Company, for sale for $75.

New Member of Denver Bar Association
G. BLANCH was admitted to membership in the Denver Bar Association at the February 3, 1947 meeting.
JOHN

